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Abstract—This paper considers the secure state estimation
problem for noisy systems in the presence of sparse sensor
integrity attacks. We show a fundamental limitation: that is,
2ρ-detectability is necessary for achieving bounded estimation
errors, where ρ is the number of attacks. This condition is
weaker than the 2ρ-observability condition typically assumed in
the literature. Conversely, we propose a real-time state estimator
that achieves the fundamental limitation. The proposed state
estimator is inspired by robust control and FDI: that is, it consists
of local Luenberger estimators, local residual detectors, and a
global fusion process. We show its performance guarantees for
H2, H∞, and ℓ1 systems. Finally, numerical examples show that
it has relatively low estimation errors among existing algorithms
and average computation time for systems with a sufficiently
small number of compromised sensors.
Index Terms—Secure state estimation, fault tolerance, sparse
sensor integrity attacks, Luenberger observer, robust control
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault tolerance in Cyber-physical Systems (CPSs) is of great
importance [1]–[5]. For example in the power system, false
data injection can introduce errors in state estimation and
provide financial gains for attackers [6]–[8]. In flights, au-
tonomous vehicles, and the Internet of Things, manipulations
in software and sensing can cause human injury and economic
damage [9]–[11]. Motivated by these security issues, this paper
studies the secure estimation problem for noisy systems in the
presence of sensor integrity attacks.
For the secure estimation problem in static systems, robust
estimators are extensively studied in the literature. Common
robust estimators include the M-estimator, L-estimator, and R-
estimator [12]–[14], and they are used to account for sensor
integrity attacks in [15]. For the secure estimation problem
in dynamical systems, robust control provides tools to deal
with noise in estimation and control [16], [17]. Although
robust control typically assumes that system disturbances are
bounded or follow well-defined distributions, such assump-
tions may not be valid for sensor faults caused by intelligent
attackers [5], [15]. Fault detection and isolation (FDI) also
provides methods for identifying and pinpointing faults in
sensors [18]–[21]. One common approach of FDI for linear
dynamical systems under sensor integrity attacks is to con-
struct residuals that take non-zero values only in the presence
of faults (see [22] and references therein). The generation
of such residuals is possible only when a fault is separable
from normal disturbances and modeling uncertainties, which
requires certain kinds of system observability.
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When attackers can change the measurements of a limited
number of sensors in large-scale systems, sensor attacks can
be modeled as sparse but unbounded disturbances. For sparse
sensor integrity attacks, recent literature has studied the fun-
damental limitation and achievable performance to identify
the attacks and estimate the system states. Fawzi et al. show
that if ρ sensors are compromised, then 2ρ-observability (i.e.,
the system remains observable after removing any set of 2ρ
sensors) is necessary to guarantee perfect attack identification
and accurate state estimation for noiseless systems [23]. The
authors further propose to solve a ℓ0 problem to achieve accu-
rate state estimation under the assumption of 2ρ-observability.
This work is generalized to noisy systems by Pajic et al. [24],
[25]. Shoukry et al. propose to use the Satisfiability Modulo
Theory (SMT) solver to harness the complexity in secure
estimation [26]. However, the worst case complexity for the
ℓ0 optimization and that of the SMT solver are combinatorial.
Moreover, these estimators also have delays, which may cause
performance degradation when used for real-time control. To
transform the problem into a convex program, Fawzi et al. and
Mo et al. propose to use optimization based methods [23],
[27]. To address the estimation delays, various Luenberger-
like observers are proposed [26]–[31]. It is worth noticing
that the estimators proposed in [24]–[27], [29]–[31] require
the assumption of 2ρ-observability or stronger to guarantee
accurate attack identification and secure state estimation.
In this paper, we consider the fundamental limitation and
achievable performance to achieve fault-tolerant estimation.
By fault-tolerant estimation, we refer to achieving bounded
estimation errors. Compared with fault identification, fault-
tolerant estimation requires relaxed assumptions and accounts
for potentially non-detectable and non-identifiable attacks in
noisy systems. We prove that a necessary condition to achieve
fault-tolerant estimation under ρ compromised sensors is that
the system is 2ρ-detectable (the system needs to remain
detectable after removing any set of 2ρ sensors). This nec-
essary condition suggests that, if a system has many stable
modes, then the number of sensors required to achieve fault-
tolerant estimation is much smaller than that to achieve fault
identification. Conversely, we propose a secure state estimator
that guarantees bounded estimation error under the assumption
of 2ρ-detectability. The proposed state estimator is inspired
by robust control and FDI: that is, it consists of the local
Luenberger estimators, the local residual detectors, and a
global fusion process. A preliminary version of this paper
was presented at the 2015 IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control, deriving the worst-case estimation errors in the ℓ1
system [28]. This paper extends the result of [28] to the H2
system and the H∞ system. To the best of our knowledge, our
paper is the first to show that a mixture of two-norm bounded
and sparse-unbounded input can produce two-norm bounded
2output. Finally, numerical examples show that the proposed
state estimator has relatively low estimation errors among
existing algorithms and average computation time for systems
with a sufficiently small number of compromised sensors.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Notations
The set of natural numbers is denoted N, the set of
non-negative integers is denoted Z+, the set of real num-
bers is denoted R, the set of non-negative real numbers is
denoted R+, and the set of complex numbers is denoted
C. The cardinality of a set S is denoted |S|. A sequence
{x(t)}t∈Z+ is abbreviated by the lower case letter x, and
the truncated sequence from t1 to t2 is denoted x(t1 : t2).
Let ‖x‖0 = |{i : ∃t s.t. xi(t) 6= 0}| denote the number
of entries in x that take non-zero values for some time.
The infinity-norm of a sequence x ∈ Rn is defined as
‖x‖∞ , suptmaxi |xi(t)|, and the two-norm of a sequence
x is defined as ‖x‖2 , (
∑∞
t=0
∑n
i=1 |xi(t)|2)1/2. Similarly,
the norms of a truncated sequence x(0 : T ) are defined as
‖x(t1 : t2)‖∞ , maxt1≤t≤t2 maxi |xi(t)| and ‖x(t1 : t2)‖2 ,
(
∑t2
t=t1
∑n
i=1 |xi(t)|2)1/2. Let ℓ∞ be the space of sequences
with bounded infinity-norm, and ℓ2 be the space of sequences
with bounded two-norm.
B. LTI Systems and System Norms
Let G be the following discrete-time linear time-invariant
(LTI) system:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bw(t), y(t) = Cx(t) +Dw(t), (1)
with the initial condition x(0) = 0, system state x(t) ∈ Rn,
system input w(t) ∈ Rl, and system output y(t) ∈ Rm. The
transfer matrix of the system is
G =
[
A B
C D
]
.
The transfer function of the system is Gˆ(z) = B(zI −
A)−1C + D. For ℓp system input and ℓq system output, the
system norm (namely, induced norm) is given by
‖G‖p→q , sup
‖w‖p 6=0
‖y‖q
‖w‖p . (2)
In particular, the induced-norms for (p, q) =
(2, 2), (2,∞), (∞,∞) are given by H∞, H2, and L1
norms, respectively. These induced-norms are bounded when
A is strictly stable (i.e., all the eigenvalues of A is in the
open unit circle). See [16], [17] for further details.
In particular, the induced-norms for (p, q) =
(2, 2), (2,∞), (∞,∞) are respectively H∞, H2, and L1
norms, which are defined as
‖G‖2→∞ = ‖G‖2 =
∫ pi
−pi
tr(Gˆ(eiθ)GˆT (e−iθ))dθ/2π (3)
‖G‖2→2 = ‖G‖∞ = ess sup
eiθ
σmaxGˆ(e
iθ) (4)
‖G‖∞→∞ = ‖G‖1 = max
1≤i≤n
l∑
j=1
∞∑
t=0
|hij(t)| (5)
where hij is the impulse response from wj(t) to yi(t). These
induced-norms are bounded when A is strictly stable (i.e., all
the eigenvalues of A is in the open unit circle). See [16] for
further details. The induced norms allow us to study
To construct a linear state estimator with bounded estima-
tion errors, the LTI system (1) is required to be detectable,
i.e., there exist some matrix K such that A + KC is stable.
Given the matrix K such that A +KC is strictly stable, we
can construct a linear estimator
xˆ(t+ 1) = Axˆ(t)−K(y(t)− Cxˆ(t)), xˆ(0) = 0. (6)
We define its estimation error e and residual vector r as
e(t) , x(t) − xˆ(t), r(t) , y(t)− Cxˆ(t),
respectively. The signals e and r satisfy the following dynam-
ics
e(t+ 1) = (A+KC)e(t) + (B +KD)w(t), e(0) = 0
r(t) = Ce(t) +Dw(t),
Thus, the LTI system from w to e, E(K), and the LTI system
from w to r, F (K), are respectively given by
E(K) =
[
A+KC B +KD
I 0
]
(7)
F (K) =
[
A+KC B +KD
C D
]
. (8)
Because A+KC is strictly stable, both E(K) and F (K) have
bounded induced-norms. The induced-norms upper-bound the
values of ‖e‖q and ‖r‖q as follows.
Lemma 1. If ‖w‖p ≤ 1, then the estimation error e and
residual vector r satisfy
‖e‖q ≤ ‖E(K)‖p→q, ‖r‖q ≤ ‖F (K)‖p→q. (9)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We study the secure state estimation problem in the presence
of sensor attacks. Consider the discrete-time LTI system:
x(t + 1) = Ax(t) +Bw(t), x(0) = 0
y(t) = Cx(t) +Dw(t) + a(t),
(10)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the system state, w(t) ∈ Rl is the
input disturbance, y(t) ∈ Rm is the output measurement, and
a(t) ∈ Rm is the bias injected by the adversary (we call
a(t) the attack). This system is illustrated in Fig. 1. The time
indices t ∈ Z+ are non-negative integers and start from zero.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the disturbance
matrix B has full row rank (otherwise we can perform the
Kalman decomposition and work on the controllable space
of (A,B)). Each sensor is indexed by i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}
and produces measurement yi(t), which jointly comprises the
measurement vector y(t) = [y1(t), . . . , ym(t)]
T . Sensor i is
said to be compromised if ai(t) 6= 0 at some time t ∈ Z+
and is said to be benign otherwise. The maximum number of
sensors that the attacker can compromise is ρ, i.e.,
‖a‖0 ≤ ρ. (11)
3If a(t) satisfies (11), then we say that it is ρ-sparse. Let S ,
{1, . . . ,m} denote the set of all sensors, C ⊂ S denote the
set of compromised sensors, and B , S\C denote the set
of benign sensors. The set C is assumed to be unknown.1 A
causal state estimator is an infinite sequence of functions {ft}
where ft is a mapping from all output measurements to a state
estimate:
xˆ(t) = ft(y(0 : t− 1)). (12)
The estimation error of (12) is defined as the difference
between the system state and the state estimate:2
e(t) , x(t)− xˆ(t). (13)
B w D
(zI −A)−1 C Estimator e
a
x
+
y
xˆ
−
Fig. 1. Diagram of the Estimation Problem in Adversarial Environment.
We consider the input containing a mixture of a p-norm
bounded disturbance and a ρ-sparse attack and study the
following worst-case estimation error in q-norm:
sup
‖w‖p≤1, ‖a‖0≤ρ
‖e‖q, (14)
where
(p, q) = (2, 2), (2,∞), (∞,∞). (15)
We consider (14) instead of attack isolation because the attack
on a noisy system may not be correctable in the sense defined
in [23], [32].
Definition 1. An causal state estimator {ft} is said to be ǫ-
resilient to attack if its worst-case estimation error satisfies
sup‖w‖p≤1, ‖a‖0≤ρ ‖e‖q < ǫ, where ǫ is a positive and finite
scalar.
When the estimator is ǫ-resilient for some finite ǫ > 0, then
we say the state estimator is resilient to attack. The goal of
this paper is to study the design problem of a resilient state
estimator {ft}. Towards that end, we first show a fundamental
limitation for the existence of a resilient estimator (Section
IV-A), and we then propose a resilient estimator (Section IV-B)
and analyze the estimation errors (Section IV-C).
1Take the setting of [32] for example. When the system is noisy, the
optimization problem minxt∈Rn ‖[y(t)
T , · · · , y(t+n−1)T ]T −Oxt‖ (O
is the observability matrix) may not give correct set of compromised sensors
{i : ∃t, ai(t) 6= 0}.
2Although abbreviate it as e(t), the estimation error is also a function of
disturbance w, attack a, and the estimator {ft}.
IV. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR
RESILIENCE TO ATTACK
In this section, we first provide a necessary condition for
the existence of a resilient estimator and then, assuming the
necessary condition, propose a resilient estimator. We first
define some notation that will be used later.
Definition 2 (Projection map). Let ei be the ith canonical
basis vector of the space Rm and I = {i1, . . . , im′} ⊆ S be
an index set with carnality m′(≤ m). We define the projection
map PI : R
m → Rm′ as
PI =
[
ei1 . . . eim′
]T ∈ Rm′×m. (16)
Using PI in (16), the measurements of the set of sensors I ⊂
S can be written as
yI(t) , PIy(t) ∈ Rm
′
.
Similarly, the measurement matrix and the sensor noise matrix
corresponding to the set of sensors I can be respectively
written as
CI , PIC, DI , PID.
A. Necessary Condition for Resilience to Attack
In this section, we give a fundamental limitation for achiev-
ing bounded worst-case estimation errors.
Definition 3. The system (10) is said to be χ-detectable if
(A,CK) is detectable for any set of sensors K ⊂ S with
cardinality |K| = m− χ.
Theorem 1. If system (10) is not 2ρ-detectable, then there
is no state estimator {ft} that is ǫ-resilient to attack for any
finite ǫ > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 1 implies that the following (denote as Condition
A) is necessary for the existence of a resilient state estimator:
A. The system (10) is 2ρ-detectable.
B. The Proposed Estimator
Assuming condition A, we now propose a resilient state
estimator. The proposed estimator constitutes two procedures:
1) local estimation and 2) global fusion. The local estimators
are defined by groups of m− ρ sensors for all combinations
V , {I ⊂ S : |I| = m− ρ}.
The number of such groups (local estimators) is |V| =
(
m
ρ
)
.
Each local estimator I generates a state estimation xˆI sep-
arately based on the measurements of its sensors yI . In the
global fusion process, the state estimate xˆ is generated using
the estimates from all local estimators I ∈ V . With slight
overlap of notation, we use I ∈ V to refer to a set of sensors
as well as to the estimator that uses these sensors. Next, we
outline these procedures and formally state the estimator in
Algorithm 1.
41) Local Estimations: From Assumption A, for any set of
sensors I ∈ V , there exists a matrix KI ∈ R(m−ρ)×n such
that A +KICI is strictly stable (has all eigenvectors in the
open unit circle).3 Using this matrix KI , we construct a local
estimator that only uses measurements from the set of sensors
I to produce a local state estimate xˆI :4
xˆI(t+ 1) = AxˆI(t)−KI(yI(t)− CI xˆI(t)) (17)
with the initial condition xˆI(0) = 0. The estimation error and
residual vector of (17) is respectively defined as
eI(t) , x(t)− xˆI(t) (18)
rI(t) , yI(t)− CI xˆI(t) (19)
The LTI system from w to eI is EI(KI) defined in (7),
whereas the LTI system from w to rI is F I(KI) defined
in (8).
When the set I does not contain any compromised sensors,
i.e., aI = 0, the residual vector r
I(t) is determined by
disturbance w alone and is bounded by
‖rI‖q ≤ ‖F I(KI)‖p→q. (20)
Condition (20) can only be violated when the set I contains
compromised sensors, so (20) is a necessary condition for all
the sensors in set I to be benign. The local estimator at time
t uses the necessary condition (20) to determine the validity
of its estimate and label local estimator I to be invalid upon
observing ‖rI(0 : t)‖q > ‖F I(KI)‖p→q.
2) Global Fusion: From above, the set of valid local
estimators I ∈ V(t) is characterized as
V(t) , {I ∈ S : ‖rI(0 : t)‖q ≤ ‖F I(KI)‖p→q} . (21)
Using V(t), we compute the global state estimate as follows:
xˆ(t) = [xˆ1(t), xˆ2(t), · · · , xˆn(t)], where
xˆi(t) =


1
2
(
min
I∈V(t)
xˆIi (t) + max
J∈V(t)
xˆJi (t)
)
q =∞
1
|V(t)|
∑
I(t)∈V(t)
xˆIi (t) q = 2.
(22)
3One way to find the matrix K is via the Riccati equation, i.e., KI =
PCT
I
(CIPC
T
I
+ DID
T
I
)−1, where P is unique stabilizing solution of
the discrete-time algebraic Riccati equation P = A(P − PCT
I
(CIPC
T
I
+
DID
T
I
)−1CIP )A
T +BBT . Sufficient conditions the existence of solution
P is that (A,CI) is detectable and (A,BB
T ) is detectable.
4 We use superscript notations for original vectors and matrices (e.g. KI
and xI , respectively) and subscript for vectors and matrices projected by (16)
(e.g. yI and CI , respectively).
Algorithm 1 The Proposed State Estimator
Initialize V(0)← V and xˆI(0)← 0, I ∈ V(0)
for t ∈ N do
for I ∈ V(t− 1) do (Local Estimation)
Initialize V(t)← ∅
Determine xˆI(t) from (17) and rI(t) from (19)
if ‖rI(0 : t)‖q ≤ ‖F I(KI)‖p→q then
V(t)← {V(t), I}
end if
end for
Obtain estimate xˆ(t) from (22) (Global Fusion)
end for
C. Resilience of the Proposed Estimator
Previous works have shown that there exist estimators that
can detect the attacks and recover the exact state for noiseless
systems if the system is 2ρ-observable [23, Proposition 2][31,
Theorem 1][29, Theorem 3.2]. In this section, we show that
the proposed estimator is resilient to attack when the system
is 2ρ-detectable.
Theorem 2. The estimator in Algorithm 1 has a bounded
estimation error. In particular, the estimation error is upper-
bounded by
max
I∈V
‖EI(KI)‖∞ + max
I,J∈V
√
1
2 log |V| DI,J2,2 if (p, q) = (2, 2)
max
I,J∈V
(
‖EI(KI)‖2 + 12DI,J2,∞
)
if (p, q) = (2,∞)
max
I,J∈V
(
‖EI(KI)‖1 + 12DI,J∞,∞
)
if (p, q) = (∞,∞).
In the above formula, the term DI,Jp,q is defined as
DI,Jp,q = αI∩Jp,q (βI,I∩Jp,q + βJ ,I∩Jp,q )
αKp,q , inf
K:A+KCK strictly stable
∥∥∥∥
[
A+KCK
[
I K
]
I 0
]∥∥∥∥
p→q
βI,Kp,q ,
∥∥∥∥
[−KI
PK,I
]∥∥∥∥
p→q
‖rI(0 : T )‖p,
where PK,I ∈ R|K|×|I| is the unique solution of PK =
PK,IPI , and ‖ · ‖p→q is an induced norm on matrix.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 2 is that condition
A is a necessary and sufficient condition for the construction
of a resilient state estimator, and that Algorithm 1 resilient to
attack. The estimation error upper-bound in Theorem 2 de-
composes into two terms: ‖EI(KI)‖p→q and the remaining.
The first term ‖EI(KI)‖p→q characterize the error between a
local estimator and the true state. That is, if the local estimator
I is used for a system with no attack (a ≡ 0), then its
estimation error is bounded by ‖EI(KI)‖p→q . The second
term exists due to the attack in an unknown set of sensors.
When (p, q) = (2, 2), the error upper-bound grows at the order
o(
√
ρ logm) for m→∞. Hence, the error can be kept small
even for systems with largem. Moreover, it shall be noted that
an increase in the tolerable number of compromised sensors
ρ may result in an increase in both terms, thus increasing the
worst-case estimation error sup‖w‖p≤1,‖a‖0=0 ‖e‖q.
5Corollary 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of an ǫ-resilient estimator for some finite ǫ > 0
is that (A,CK) is detectable for any index set K ⊂ S with
cardinality m− 2ρ.
Corollary 2. Consider system (10) with ρ-sparse attack. The
state estimator in Algorithm 1 is ǫ-resilient to attack for some
finite ǫ > 0.
V. PROOF FOR RESILIENCE OF THE PROPOSED ESTIMATOR
We highlight important parts of the proof of Theorem 2 in
this section and present the complete proof in the extended
version of this paper [33]. The proof of Theorem 2 has
two procedures: 1) bounding local estimation errors, and 2)
bounding global fusion errors. Specifically, from the triangular
inequality, at any time t ∈ Z+, the estimation error satisfies
‖e‖q =
∥∥(x− xˆI)+ (xˆI − xˆ)∥∥
q
≤ ∥∥x− xˆI∥∥
q
+
∥∥xˆI − xˆ∥∥
q
. (23)
where I ∈ B ⊂ V is a set that only contains benign sensors
(denote I as the benign estimator). The benign estimator I
exists from assumption (11). The first term ‖x− xˆI‖q can be
bounded using Lemma 1 by
‖x− xˆI‖q ≤ ‖EI(KI)‖p→q. (24)
Now it only remains to show that the second term is bounded.
To bound the second term, we first bound the difference
between the estimates of any two valid local estimators
J1, J2 ∈ V(T ) up to time T ∈ Z+, which is given in
Lemma 2. We then use Lemma 2 to show that the difference
between the estimates of the benign estimator I ∈ V and
the global estimator is finite. This is shown in Lemma 3 for
(p, q) = (2, 2) and in Lemma 4 for (p, q) = (2,∞), (∞,∞).
In these lemmas, each set of sensors in V are labeled into
J1,J2, · · · ,J|V|. (25)
Lemma 2. Assume that Condition A holds. Let J1, J2 ∈
V(T ) be two sets of sensors that are valid at time T . The
divergence between the local estimator J1 and J2 up to time
T satisfies
‖xˆJ1(0 : T )− xˆJ2(0 : T )‖q ≤ DJ1,J2p,q , (26)
where right hand side is finite, i.e., DJ1,J2p,q <∞ .
Lemma 3. If condition (26) holds for (p, q) = (2, 2) at
all time T ∈ Z+, then the divergence between the benign
estimator I and the global estimator satisfies
‖xˆI − xˆ‖2 ≤ max
J1,J2∈V
√
1
2
log |V| DJ1,J2p,q . (27)
Lemma 4. If condition (26) holds for (p, q) = (2,∞), (∞,∞)
at all time T ∈ Z+, then the divergence between the benign
estimator I and the global estimator satisfies
‖xˆI − xˆ‖∞ ≤ 1
2
max
J∈V
DI,Jp,∞. (28)
We prove Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Lemma 4 in Section V-A,
Section V-B, and Section V-C, respectively. Combining all of
the above, we are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof (Theorem 2). Taking supremum over all t ∈ Z+ and
maximizing over all sensor sets I in Lemma 3, we obtain
sup
‖w‖2≤1
‖a‖0≤ρ
‖e‖2 ≤ max
I∈V
‖EI(KI)‖∞ + max
J1,J2∈V
√
1
2
log |V| DI,J2,2 .
Applying similar argument for the case of q =∞, we obtain
‖e‖∞ ≤ max
I,J∈V
(
‖EI(KI)‖p→∞ + 1
2
DI,Jp,∞
)
,
where p = 2,∞.
A. Proof of Lemma 2
We first present a lemma, using which we prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 5. Consider system (1) where (A,C) is detectable
and ‖w‖p ≤ 1. If y(t) = 0 for all t = 0, 1, · · · , T , then
‖x(0 : T )‖q ≤ inf
K:A+KC strictly stable
‖E(K)‖p→q, (29)
where E(K) is given in (7).
Proof (Lemma 5). As (A,C) is detectable, A+KC is strictly
stable for some matrix K . For such stabilizing K , we can
construct the state estimator (6). Since y(0 : T ) = 0, the
state estimator (6) produces zero estimate xˆ(0 : T ) = 0. From
Lemma 1, we obtain
‖x(0 : T )‖q = ‖e(0 : T )‖q ≤ ‖E(K)‖p→q.
Taking infimum over all K such that A+KC is strictly stable,
we obtain (29).
Proof (Lemma 2). Let J1, J2 ∈ V(T ). We first compute the
dynamics of the local estimates xˆJi(t), i = 1, 2. From (17)
and (19),
xˆJi (t+ 1) = AxˆJi (t)−KJirJi (t), xˆJi (0) = 0
yJi(t) = CJi xˆ
Ji(t) + rJi (t)
(30)
for t ≤ T . We define the sequences φJi(t) and ϕJi(t) by
φJi (t) , −KJirJi(t), ϕJi(t) , PK1,2,JirJi (t),
where PK1,2,Ji ∈ R|K1,2|×|Ji| is the unique solution of
PK1,2 = PK1,2,JiPJi . Let K1,2 = J1 ∩ J2 the intersection
between the two sets J1,J2. As the measurements from
subset K1,2 ⊂ Ji also satisfies yK1,2(t) = CK1,2 xˆJi(t) +
PK1,2,Jir
Ji (t), combining with (30) yields
xˆJi(t+ 1) = AxˆJi (t) +
[
I 0
] [φJi(t)
ϕJi(t)
]
, xˆJi (0) = 0
yK1,2(t) = CK1,2 xˆ
Ji(t) +
[
0 I
] [φJi(t)
ϕJi(t)
]
.
(31)
Now, let ∆(t) be the difference between the local estimator
J1 and local estimator J2, i.e.,
∆(t) , xˆJ1(t)− xˆJ2 (t). (32)
6Subtracting the equation (31) for J1 from equation (31) for
J2, we obtain the dynamics of ∆ as follows:
∆(t+ 1) = A∆(t) +
[
I 0
] [φJ1 (t)− φJ2(t)
ϕJ1 (t)− ϕJ2(t)
]
, ∆(t) = 0,
0 = CK1,2∆(t) +
[
0 I
] [φJ1(t)− φJ2 (t)
ϕJ1(t)− ϕJ2(t)
]
.
Because a valid set satisfies (21), the residual vectors of
estimator Ji, i = 1, 2, are bounded by ‖rJi(0 : T )‖q ≤
‖FJi(KJi)‖p→q, which results in∥∥∥∥
[
φJi (0 : T )
ϕJi(0 : T )
]∥∥∥∥
p
≤
∥∥∥∥
[ −KJi
PK1,2,Ji
]∥∥∥∥
p→p
‖rJi(0 : T )‖p
= βJi,J1∩J2p,q . (33)
From the triangle inequality, we obtain∥∥∥∥
[
φJ1 (0 : T )− φJ2(0 : T )
ϕJ1 (0 : T )− ϕJ2(0 : T )
]∥∥∥∥
p
≤ βJ1,J1∩J2p,q + βJ2,J1∩J2p,q .
Substitute φJ1 − φJ2 for u in Lemma 5 and ∆(t) for x, we
obtain
‖xˆJ1(0 : T )−xˆJ2(0 : T )‖q ≤ αJ1∩J2p,q (βJ1,J1∩J2p,q +βJ1,J1∩J2p,q ).
B. Proof of Lemma 3
Define the following two optimization problems:
Pδ(n) := max
zk(i)≥0
n∑
i=1
(
1
n− i − 1
)2( n∑
k=i
zk(i)
)2
s.t.
k∑
i=0
(zk(i))
2 ≤ δ, k = 1, 2, . . . , n
Dδ(n) := min
λi>0
n∑
i=1
λi
s.t.
j∑
i=1
1
λi
≤ (j + 1)2, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
With the slight abuse of notation, we will also denote Pδ(n),
Dδ(n) as the optimal solutions of the optimization problem
Pδ(n), Dδ(n), respectively. We first show that Pδ(N − 1)
with
δ = max
J1,J2∈V
(
DJ1,J22,2
)2
(34)
is an upper-bound of
∥∥xˆI − xˆ∥∥
2
(Lemma 6). The problem
Pδ(n) is then converted into its dual problem Dδ(n), between
which the duality gap is zero (Lemma 7). The dual problem
Dδ(n) admits an analytical solution that can be upper-bounded
by a simple formula (Lemma 10).
Lemma 6. If condition (26) holds for (p, q) = (2, 2), then
the divergence between the benign estimator I and the global
estimator satisfies
‖xˆI − xˆ‖22 ≤ Pδ(N − 1), (35)
where N = |V| and δ = maxJ1,J2∈V
(
DJ1,J22,2
)2
.
Proof (Lemma 6). In order to relate the infinite sequence
xˆI(t)−xˆ(t) with the finite-dimensional optimization problems
Pδ(n), we first divide the infinite time horizon into a finite
sequence as below. Let Ti be the time the set Ii becomes
invalid and T0 = 0. Without loss of generality, we assume
that
T1 ≤ T2 ≤ · · · ≤ TN−1 ≤ TN =∞.
The relation TN = ∞ holds because IN is a valid from
assumption (11). We call IN the benign estimator. If Ti =
∞, then we define {xIi(t)}t∈Z+ as an infinite sequence
of points in Rn. Otherwise, if Ti is finite, then we define
{xIi(t)}t=0,...,Ti as a finite sequence of length Ti + 1.
Recall that IN is the benign estimator. Let △Ik(t) =
xˆIN (t) − xˆIk(t) denote the difference between the benign
estimator IN and other local estimator Ik. We first define
the following variable:
zk(i) = ‖△Ik(Ti + 1 : Ti+1)‖2,
where k = 1, · · · , N − 1 and i = 0, · · · , k.
Using zk(i), we can bound the estimation error between the
local estimator IN and the global estimator as follows:
‖xˆIN − xˆ‖22
=
∞∑
t=0
‖xˆIN (t)− xˆ(t)‖22
=
N−2∑
i=0
Ti+1∑
t=Ti+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥xˆIN (t)−
1
|V(t)|
N∑
j=i+1
xˆIj (t)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
N−2∑
i=0
Ti+1∑
t=Ti+1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N − i
N−1∑
k=i+1
(
xˆIN (t)− xˆIk(t))
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
N−2∑
i=0
(
1
N − i
)2 ∥∥∥∥∥
N−1∑
k=i+1
△Ik(Ti + 1 : Ti+1)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤
N−2∑
i=0
(
1
N − i
)2( N−1∑
k=i+1
∥∥△Ik(Ti + 1 : Ti+1)∥∥2
)2
=
N−2∑
i=0
(
1
N − i
)2( N−1∑
k=i+1
zk(i)
)2
The sum of i and j counts only up to N − 1 since xˆ(t) =
xˆIN (t) for t > TN−1 + 1. We also used Cauchy Schwarz
inequality in the second to last line. Using the above relation,
‖xˆIN − xˆ‖22 is upper-bounded by the optimal value of the
following problem:
max
zk(i)≥0
N−2∑
i=0
(
1
N − i
)2( N−1∑
k=i+1
zk(i)
)2
s.t.
k∑
i=0
(zk(i))
2 ≤ max
J1,J2∈V
(
DJ1,J22,2
)2
, k = 1, . . . , N − 1,
(36)
which is the optimization problem Pδ(N − 1) with δ =
maxJ1,J2∈V
(
DJ1,J22,2
)2
.
7Lemma 7. The problems Pδ(n), Dδ(n) have identical optimal
values, i.e., Pδ(n) = Dδ(n).
We use the following lemma to prove Lemma 7. The proof of
Lemma 8 is given in the extended version of this paper [33].
Lemma 8. The following two inequalities are equivalent
Λ = diag(λ1, λ2, · · · , λn) ≥ 11T (37)
n∑
i=1
1
λi
≤ 1, and λj > 0, j = 1, . . . , n (38)
We will use the following lemma to prove Lemma 8.
Lemma 9 (Lemma 1.1 of [34]). If Λ ∈ Rn×n is an invertible
matrix, and u, v ∈ Rn are two column vectors, then
det(Λ + uvT ) = (1 + vTΛ−1u) det(Λ).
Proof (Lemma 8). We first show that (37) implies (38). From
(37), λi ≥ 1, so Λ is invertible. From Lemma 9, we have(
1−
n∑
i=1
1
λi
)
n∏
i=1
λi = (1−1TΛ−11) det(Λ) = det(Λ−11T )
Since Λ ≥ 11T , the determinant of Λ− 11T is non-negative,
which proves (38). We then show that (38) implies (37).
Denote the k-th leading principal minor of Λ − 11T as ∆k.
By Lemma 9, we obtain that
∆k =
(
1−
k∑
i=1
1
λi
)
k∏
i=1
λi ≥ 0,
which proves (37).
Proof (Lemma 7). Let v ∈ Rn(n−1)/2 be a vector that is
composed of zi+1:n(j) = {zi+1(j), zi+2(j), · · · , zn(j)} for
all j = 0, 1, · · · , p, i.e.,
v ,
[
z1:n(0), z2:n(1), · · · , zn(n)
]
.
Let the following matrices be defined as
X = vvT ≥ 0
F0 = diag
(
1
22
, · · · , 1n−11
T
n−1
(n)2
,
1n1
T
n
(n+ 1)2
)
(39)
Fi = diag (en,i, en−1,i, · · · , en−i+1,i, 0n−i, · · · , 01)
where 1k is a k-dimensional vector with all elements being
1; ek,j is a k-dimensional row vector with j-th entry being
1 and other entries being 0; and 0k is a k-dimensional row
vector with all elements being 0. Using SDP relaxation [35],
the problem Pδ(n) can be converted into
P ′δ(n) =max
X≥0
tr(F0X)
s.t. tr(FiX) ≤ δ, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
Hence Pδ(n) ≤ P ′δ(n). This relaxation can be observed from
the following relations:
n−1∑
i=0
(
1
n− i+ 1
)2( n∑
k=i+1
zk(i)
)2
= vTF0v = tr(F0vv
T )
k∑
i=0
(zk(i))
2 = vTFiv = tr(Fivv
T ).
We next show that the relaxation of the problem Pδ(n) to
the semidefinite problem P ′δ(n) is also exact. Assume that
Pδ(n) is feasible and bounded. LetX∗ = {x∗ij} be the optimal
solution of P ′δ. Define X as
X =
[√
x∗11 . . .
√
x∗nn
]T [√
x∗11 . . .
√
x∗nn
]
.
From xii = x
∗
ii and (39), X satisfies the contraints
tr(FiX) = tr(FiX
∗) = δ. (40)
Furthermore, because X∗ is the optimal solution and xij =√
x∗iix
∗
jj ≥ x∗ij (due to X∗ ≥ 0),
tr(F0X
∗) ≥ tr(F0X) ≥ tr(F0X∗). (41)
Therefore, (40) and (41) shows that Pδ(n) = P ′δ(n).
Next, we consider the following dual problem of P ′δ(n):
D′δ(n) = min
λ
δ
n∑
i=1
λi (42)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
λiFi ≥ F0.
Because there exists an strictly positive definite matrix X > 0
such that tr(FiX) = δ for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n, from
Slater’s condition [36], strong duality holds between P ′δ(n)
and D′δ(n). Let Λ1:i = diag(λ1, . . . , λi) ∈ Ri×i, and observe
that
∑n
i=1 λiFi = diag(Λ1:1,Λ1:2, . . . ,Λ1:n). Hence, the
constraint
∑n
i=1 λiFi ≥ F0 is equivalent to
diag(λ1, . . . , λj) ≥ 1
(j + 1)2
11
T , ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
⇐⇒
j∑
i=1
1
λi
≤ (j + 1)2, λj > 0, j = 1, . . . , n,
where the second line is due to Lemma 8. Therefore, the dual
problem D′δ(n) can be reformulated into Dδ(n).
Lemma 10. The solution of the problem Dδ(n) satisfies
Dδ(n) = δ
{
1
4
+
n∑
i=2
1
2i+ 1
}
≤ 1
2
δ log(n+ 1). (43)
Proof (Lemma 10). We first consider the case when n ≥ 2.
Let us define an auxiliary variable
sk =
k∑
i=1
δ
λi
, k = 1, · · · , n, (44)
where s0 = 0, and sk = 0 for k ≥ n+ 1. Using the auxiliary
variable sk, we rewrite the optimization problem Dδ(n) as
min
n∑
i=1
1
si − si−1
s.t. si ≤ (i+ 1)2, si−1 ≤ si, i = 1, . . . , n
(45)
We define the Lagrangian L : Rn × Rn × Rn → R of the
problem (45) as follows:
L(s, µ, η) =
n∑
i=1
1
si − si−1 +µi(si− (i+1)
2)+ηi(si−1−si).
8Let (s∗, µ∗, η∗) be any optimal primal and dual variables,
then (s∗, µ∗, η∗) satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. Solving the KKT conditions, we obtain that
s∗i = (i+ 1)
2, i = 1, . . . , n
η∗i = 0, i = 1, . . . , n
µ∗i =


1
16 − 125 if i = 1
1
(2i+1)2 − 1(2i+3)2 if i = 2, . . . , n− 1
1
(2n+1)2 if i = n
To see this, observe that
1) s∗i − (i+ 1)2 ≤ 0, µ∗i (s∗i − (i+ 1)2) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
2) s∗i−1 − s∗i ≤ 0, η∗i (s∗i−1 − s∗i ) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
3) µ∗i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n
4) η∗i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
5) dL(s∗, µ∗, η∗)/dsi = 0
Since the problem (45), which is equivalent with Dδ(n), is a
convex problem, the KKT conditions are sufficient for opti-
mality [36]. Therefore, the optimal primal and dual variables
are (s∗, µ∗, η∗), which result in the optimal value
Dδ(n) = 1
4
+
n∑
i=2
1
2i+ 1
. (46)
Next, we upper-bound the optimal cost D′δ(n). Since the
function f(i) = (2i + 1)−1, i ≥ 1, is convex, from
Jensen’s inequality, f(i) is upper-bounded by f(i) ≤
1
2 (f(i− t/2) + f(i+ t/2)) , for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Integrating
this along t ∈ [0, 1], we obtain that
f(i) ≤ 1
2
∫ 1
t=0
f
(
i− t
2
)
+ f
(
i+
t
2
)
dt
=
1
2
(log(i+ 1)− log(i)).
Combining above bound with (46), we establish a lower-bound
of the optimal value
Dδ(n) = δ
{
1
4
+
n∑
i=1
1
2i+ 1
− 1
3
}
≤ 1
2
δ log(n+ 1)
On the other hand, when n = 1, the optimal variable is
λ∗1 = δ/4, which attains the optimal value Dδ(1) = δ/4 ≤
log(2)/2 ≈ δ0.346574.
Proof (Lemma 3). Applying Lemma 2 and Lemma 6, Lemma
7, and then Lemma 10 consecutively, we obtain
‖xˆI − xˆ‖22 ≤ Pδ = Dδ ≤
1
2
log(N) max
J1,J2∈V
(
DJ1,J22,2
)2
.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 is a trivial extension of the following Proposition.
We omit its prove due to space constraints.
Proposition 1. Let z1, . . . , zl be real numbers. Define
z =
1
2
(
max
i
zi +min
i
zi
)
.
Then for any i, we have
|z − zi| ≤ 1
2
max
j
|zj − zi|. (47)
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VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we study the proposed estimator numerically
and compare it with existing algorithms from Shoukry et
al. [26], Chong et al. [31], Pajic et al. [32], and Lu et al. [30].
We tested the IEEE 14-Bus system, the Unmanned Ground
Vehicle (UGV), and the temperature monitor as follows.
(i) IEEE 14-Bus system [8], [26], [37]: The IEEE 14-
Bus system is modeled as the system (10) with A and
C given in [37]. We additionally add process noise
and sensor noise by setting B =
[
I10 O10,35
]
and
D =
[
O10,35 I35
]
.
(ii) Unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) [26], [32]: A UGV
moving in a straight line has the dynamics[
p˙
v˙
]
=
[
0 1
0 −b/m
] [
x˙
v˙
]
+
[
0
1/m
]
u+
[
I2 O2,3
]
w,
where p is the position, v is the velocity, u is the force
input, w is the disturbance,m is the mechanical mass, b is
the translational friction coefficient, In is a n-dimensional
identity matrix, and On,m is a m × n zero matrix. We
assume that the estimator can access the values of u. The
UGV is equipped with a sensor measuring x and two
sensors measuring v, i.e.,
y =

1 00 1
0 1

[p
v
]
+
[
O3,2 I2
]
w.
The system parameters are the same as [26]: m = 0.8kg,
b = 1, and sampling interval Ts = 0.1s.
(iii) Temperature monitor [38]: The heat process in a plannar
closed region (z1, z2) ∈ [0, l]× [0, l] can be expressed by
∂x
∂t
= α
(
∂2x
∂z21
+
∂2x
∂z22
)
, (48)
where α is the speed of the diffusion process; and
x(z1, z2) is the temperature at position (z1, z2) subject
to the boundary conditions
∂x
∂z1
∣∣∣∣
t,0,z2
=
∂x
∂z1
∣∣∣∣
t,l,z2
=
∂x
∂z1
∣∣∣∣
t,z1,0
=
∂x
∂z1
∣∣∣∣
t,z1,l
= 0.
We discretize the region using a N × N grid and
the continuous-time with sampling interval Ts to model
(48) into (10). We additionally add process noise and
sensor noise by setting w, B =
[
I9 O9,20
]
and D =[
O9,20 I20
]
. We set α = 0.1m2/s, l = 4m, and N = 5
as in [38].
The noise w is generated from a uniform distribution
between [−1, 1]. The time horizon is set to be T = 100.
The number of compromised sensors is set to be 1; the
compromised sensor is randomly chosen among non-critical
sensors (i.e., sensors that can be removed without losing
observability). The attack signal is drawn from a Gaussian
9Proposed [26] [31] [24] [30]
(i) 11.1573 17.2948 13.7927 48.9880 17.5957
(ii) 6.9108 4.7246 7.2937 22.0884 NA
(iii) 6.7833 7.9424 6.8902 8.5448 18.5803
TABLE I
ESTIMATION ERRORS IN TWO-NORM ‖e(1 : 100)‖2 WHEN THE ATTACK
VARIANCE IS 104 .
Proposed [26] [31] [24] [30]
(i) 0.0062 0.0108 0.0045 0.0006 0.0345
(ii) 0.0001 0.0026 0.0002 0.0003 NA
(iii) 0.0023 0.0096 0.0020 0.0005 0.0048
TABLE II
AVERAGE COMPUTATION TIME IN SECOND FOR TIME HORIZON 100 WHEN
THE ATTACK VARIANCE IS 104 .
Proposed [26] [31] [32] [30]
(i) 6.4653 9.6477 7.4754 9.8822 17.3752
(ii) 6.8500 4.6481 7.2884 23.3668 NA
(iii) 6.7060 8.0070 6.8144 8.6655 NA
TABLE III
ESTIMATION ERRORS IN TWO-NORM, i.e., ‖e(1 : 100)‖2 WHEN THE
ATTACK VARIANCE IS 1.
Proposed [26] [31] [32] [30]
(i) 0.0062 0.0109 0.0046 0.0005 0.0325
(ii) 0.0001 0.0024 0.0002 0.0003 NA
(iii) 0.0023 0.0093 0.0020 0.0004 NA
TABLE IV
AVERAGE COMPUTATION TIME IN SECOND FOR TIME HORIZON 100 WHEN
THE ATTACK VARIANCE IS 1.
distribution with mean zero and variance 104 and 1. For the
proposed algorithm, we used (20) with (p, q) = (2, 2), (2,∞),
and (∞,∞) simultaneously. We ran each example for 100
times and recorded their average estimation errors ‖e‖2 and
computation times. The code is written in Matlab (Windows)
and runs on an Intel Core i5-4690 Processor (4x3.50GHz/6MB
L3 Cache). We summarize the estimation errors and com-
putation times in Table I and Table II. Some entries are
left as NA (not applicable) because the system (ii) does not
satisfy the linear matrix inequality (LMI) assumption required
by the algorithm proposed by [30]. The algorithms tested
have different relative accuracies and computation times from
example to example. Among all examples tested, the proposed
algorithm has relatively low estimation errors and average
computation times.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a real-time state estimator for
noisy systems that is resilient to sparse sensor integrity attacks.
The proposed estimator is stable under relaxed assumptions.
Its worst-case estimation errors are O(log
(
m
ρ
)
) in the H2
system, O(1) in the H∞ system, and O(1) in the ℓ1 system.
Its computational complexity is O(log
(
m
ρ
)
).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
An intermediate step in the proof of Theorem 1 is to
consider the following condition (denote as Condition B).
B. There exist two states (x, x′), two disturbances (w,w′),
and two attacks (a, a′) such that all of the followings are
satisfied:
a) both (x,w, a) and (x′, w′, a′) satisfies the dynamics
(10) and assumptions ‖a‖0 ≤ γ, and ‖w‖p ≤ 1
b) y(t) = y(t)′ at all time t ∈ N
c) the difference between the two states is unbounded,
i.e., ‖x− x′‖q =∞.
Lemma 11. If (A,CK) is not detectable for some set K ⊂ S
with |K| = m− 2γ, then Condition B holds.
Proof (Lemma 11). We first prove that an undetectable
(A,CK) implies that the linear transformation Ot : Rn →
Rt(m−2γ) defined by
Ot =


CK
CKA
CKA
2
...
CKA
t−1


has a non-trivial kernel (Step 1). Form the kernel space of Ot,
we then find two states (x, x′) that satisfy condition B (Step
2).
Step 1: If (A,CK) is not detectable for some set of sensors
K, then at least one of the following conditions holds.
(i) For some z ∈ R, abs(z) ≥ 1 and v ∈ Rn, Av = zv and
Cv = 0.
(i) For some complex conjugate pairs z, z¯ ∈ C, abs(z) =
abs(z¯) ≥ 1 and v, v¯ ∈ Cn, Av = zv, Av¯ = z¯v¯, Cv = 0,
and Cv¯ = 0 .
Condition (i) implies that
Otv = 0, t ∈ N (49)
and Condition (i) implies that
Ot(v + v¯) = 0, t ∈ N. (50)
Step2: We construct two dynamics with the same mea-
surement. There exists two disjoint sets of sensors K1,K2
that satisfy |K1| = |K2| = γ, K1 ∩ K2 ∩ K = ∅, and
K∪K1∪K2 = S. Consider first when condition (i) holds. Since
B has full-rank, there exists an impulse disturbance w(0) that
produces
x(1) = v,
w(t) = 0, t ≥ 1
ai(t) =
{
−Cix(t) i ∈ K1
0 Otherwise
(51)
and
x′(1) = 0
w′(t) = 0, t ≥ 1
a′i(t) =
{
Cix(t) i ∈ K2
0 Otherwise,
(52)
where Ci denotes the i-th row of sensing matrix C. Using (49),
we can show that measurement y(t) under (51) and y′(t) under
(52) are identical. However, the state under (51) is x(t) = ztv,
the state under (51) is x′(t) = 0, and thus their difference
‖x − x′‖q is unbounded. Consider next when condition (ii)
holds. There exists an impulse disturbance w(0) that achieves
x(1) = v + v¯, so let x(1) = v + v¯ replace x(1) in (51).
Similarly, we can derive from (50) that measurements y(t)
10
and y′(t) are identical, but x(t) = ztv + z¯kv¯ and x′(t) = 0,
yielding unbounded ‖x− x′‖q. Since at least (i) or (ii) holds,
we have proved Condition B.
Lemma 12. If Condition E holds, then a resilient estimator
cannot be constructed.
Proof (Lemma 12). Let xˆ be the state estimation of any es-
timator when measurement y = y′ is observed. From the
the triangle inequality, the estimation error e = x − xˆ under
(x,w, a, y) and error e′ = x′− xˆ under (x′, w′, a′, y′) satisfies
‖x− x′‖q ≤ ‖e‖q + ‖e′‖q (53)
This suggests that either ‖e‖q or ‖e′‖q are unbounded. Because
sup
‖w‖p≤1, ‖a‖0≤γ
‖e‖q ≥ max{‖e‖q, ‖e′‖q}, (54)
no estimator can achieve bounded worst-case estimation error.
Proof (Theorem 1). From Lemma 11, if (A,CK) being not
detectable for some set K ⊂ S with |K| = m − 2γ, then
Condition B holds. However, due to Lemma 12, Condition B
implies that no resilient estimator can be constructed.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Professor John Doyle and
Professor Richard Murray for insightful discussions.
REFERENCES
[1] A. A. Cardenas, S. Amin, and S. Sastry, “Secure control: towards sur-
vivable cyber-physical systems,” in IEEE 28th International Conference
on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCS). IEEE, 2008,
pp. 495–500.
[2] A. Cardenas, S. Amin, B. Sinopoli, A. Giani, A. Perrig, and S. Sastry,
“Challenges for securing cyber physical systems,” in Workshop on future
directions in cyber-physical systems security, vol. 5, 2009.
[3] R. R. Rajkumar, I. Lee, L. Sha, and J. Stankovic, “Cyber-physical
systems: the next computing revolution,” in Proceedings of the 47th
Design Automation Conference. ACM, 2010, pp. 731–736.
[4] S. Sridhar, A. Hahn, and M. Govindarasu, “Cyber–physical system
security for the electric power grid,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 100,
no. 1, pp. 210–224, 2012.
[5] A. Datta, S. Kar, B. Sinopoli, and S. Weerakkody, “Accountability
in cyber-physical systems,” in Science of Security for Cyber-Physical
Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS). IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–3.
[6] H. Sandberg, A. Teixeira, and K. H. Johansson, “On security indices
for state estimators in power networks,” in First Workshop on Secure
Control Systems, 2010.
[7] L. Xie, Y. Mo, and B. Sinopoli, “Integrity data attacks in power market
operations,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 659–
666, 2011.
[8] Y. Liu, M. Reiter, and P. Ning, “False data injection attacks against
state estimation in electric power grids,” in Proceedings of the 16th
ACM conference on Computer and communications security, 2009.
[9] J. P. Farwell and R. Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the future of cyber war,”
Survival, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 23–40, 2011.
[10] M. Maurer, J. C. Gerdes, B. Lenz, and H. Winner, Autonomous driving:
technical, legal and social aspects. Springer, 2016.
[11] C. Nobles, “Cyber threats in civil aviation,” Security Solutions for
Hyperconnectivity and the Internet of Things, p. 272, 2016.
[12] S. A. Kassam and H. V. Poor, “Robust techniques for signal processing:
A survey,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 73, no. 3, pp. 433–481, 1985.
[13] R. A. Maronna, D. R. Martin, and V. J. Yohai, Robust Statistics: Theory
and Methods. Wiley, 2006.
[14] P. J. Huber and E. M. Ronchetti, Robust Statistics. Wiely, 2009.
[15] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “Secure estimation in the presence of integrity
attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 60, no. 4, pp.
1145–1151, 2015.
[16] M. A. Dahleh and I. J. Diaz-Bobillo, Control of uncertain systems: a
linear programming approach. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1994.
[17] K. Zhou, J. C. Doyle, and K. Glover, Robust and optimal control.
Prentice hall New Jersey, 1996, vol. 40.
[18] J. Gertler, Fault detection and diagnosis in engineering systems. CRC
press, 1998.
[19] V. Venkatasubramanian, R. Rengaswamy, K. Yin, and S. N. Kavuri,
“A review of process fault detection and diagnosis: Part i: Quantitative
model-based methods,” Computers & chemical engineering, vol. 27,
no. 3, pp. 293–311, 2003.
[20] R. Isermann, Fault-diagnosis systems: an introduction from fault detec-
tion to fault tolerance. Springer Science & Business Media, 2006.
[21] J. Chen and R. J. Patton, Robust model-based fault diagnosis for dynamic
systems. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012, vol. 3.
[22] R. J. Patton, P. M. Frank, and R. N. Clark, Issues of fault diagnosis for
dynamic systems. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.
[23] H. Fawzi, P. Tabuada, and S. Diggavi, “Secure estimation and control for
cyber-physical systems under adversarial attacks,” IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, vol. 59, no. 6, pp. 1454–1467, 2014.
[24] M. Pajic, J. Weimer, N. Bezzo, O. Sokolsky, G. J. Pappas, and I. Lee,
“Design and implementation of attack-resilient cyberphysical systems:
With a focus on attack-resilient state estimators,” IEEE Control Systems,
vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 66–81, 2017.
[25] M. Pajic, I. Lee, and G. J. Pappas, “Attack-resilient state estimation for
noisy dynamical systems,” IEEE Transactions on Control of Network
Systems, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 82–92, 2017.
[26] Y. Shoukry, P. Nuzzo, A. Puggelli, A. L. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, S. A.
Seshia, and P. Tabuada, “Secure state estimation for cyber physical
systems under sensor attacks: a satisfiability modulo theory approach,”
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2017.
[27] Y. Mo and E. Garone, “Secure dynamic state estimation via local
estimators,” in Decision and Control (CDC), 2016 IEEE 55th Conference
on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 5073–5078.
[28] Y. Nakahira and Y. Mo, “Dynamic state estimation in the presence
of compromised sensory data,” in IEEE 54th Annual Conference on
Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2015, pp. 5808–5813.
[29] Y. Shoukry and P. Tabuada, “Event-triggered state observers for sparse
sensor noise/attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 61,
no. 8, pp. 2079–2091, 2016.
[30] A.-Y. Lu and G.-H. Yang, “Secure state estimation for cyber-physical
systems under sparse sensor attacks via a switched luenberger observer,”
Information sciences, vol. 417, pp. 454–464, 2017.
[31] M. S. Chong, M. Wakaiki, and J. P. Hespanha, “Observability of linear
systems under adversarial attacks,” in American Control Conference
(ACC). IEEE, 2015, pp. 2439–2444.
[32] M. Pajic, J. Weimer, N. Bezzo, P. Tabuada, O. Sokolsky, I. Lee, and G. J.
Pappas, “Robustness of attack-resilient state estimators,” in ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS). IEEE,
2014, pp. 163–174.
[33] Y. Nakahira and Y. Mo, “Attack-Resilient H2, H∞, and ℓ1
State Estimator (Extended Version),” Tech. Rep. [Online]. Available:
http://users.cms.caltech.edu/∼ynakahir/security.pdf
[34] “Eigenvalues of rank-one updated matrices with some applications,”
Applied Mathematics Letters, vol. 20, no. 12, pp. 1223–1226, 2007.
[35] S. H. Low, “Convex relaxation of optimal power flow: A tutorial,” in
Bulk Power System Dynamics and Control-IX Optimization, Security and
Control of the Emerging Power Grid (IREP), 2013 IREP Symposium.
IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–15.
[36] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
[37] R. D. Zimmerman, C. E. Murillo-Sa´nchez, and R. J. Thomas, “Mat-
power: Steady-state operations, planning, and analysis tools for power
systems research and education,” IEEE Transactions on power systems,
vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 12–19, 2011.
[38] Y. Mo, R. Ambrosino, and B. Sinopoli, “Sensor selection strategies
for state estimation in energy constrained wireless sensor networks,”
Automatica, vol. 47, no. 7, pp. 1330–1338, 2011.
